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Evidence from Benin’s shrimp sector
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Abstract 
The inability of Benin to comply with EU food safety standards led a suspension on its 
shrimp exports from July 2003 to February 2005. The impact of the export ban is studied 
in an open-economy, supply-demand framework; by means of qualitative interviews and 
analysis of household survey data. The ban had a negative welfare impact on the shrimp-
exporting firms, the fishmongers and the artisanal fishermen. More importantly, the 
negative impact persisted several years after the ban was lifted. Exports did not revive 
because of the poor institutional environment in Benin, as well as the smallness of the 
shrimp sector. For the fishermen, the ban resulted in a persistent welfare loss because 
their coping strategies were deficient. They were locked in the fishery sector, and the 
domestic and regional demand for shrimp could not fully compensate for the loss of the 
EU market.  
Keywords: EU food safety standards, trade, aid, shrimp, Benin 
JEL classification codes: F1, O13, Q17, Q18
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1. Introduction 
The WTO agreements on sanitary and phytosanitary measures in 1995 inaugurated 
important changes in the food safety and quality standards of major food importing 
economies (e.g., the EU, the USA and Japan). More food standards were being imposed 
that apply to more products and to more substances. The standards have also become 
tighter, and full traceability is required through Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points 
(HACCP1) in the food-processing industries of these countries as well as in those of their 
trade partners. Furthermore, there are now more internal and border food-safety controls, 
which increase the probability of detection of non-compliance (European Commission, 
2009).  
While these measures are likely to have achieved their primary objective of 
improved consumer-health protection in developed economies (e.g., Golan et al., 2000), 
they have come at a cost as producers need to devote additional financial and human 
resources to complying with them. Producers are also facing new risks, including 
withdrawal of their product from the market, rejection of exports at the border, 
destruction of shipments, or, in the worst case – an outright export ban on all products 
from the company or the sector involved (e.g., Batz et al., 2011).  
These additional costs and risks have raised concerns that standards may act as 
non-tariff barriers to trade for those countries and small-scale producers with relatively 
few resources and limited expertise, possibly leading to their exclusion from lucrative 
export markets (e.g., Garcia Martinez and Poole, 2004; Gibbon, 2003; Henson, and 
Loader, 2001; Kherralah, 2000; Reardon et al. 1999; Key and Runsten, 1999; Farina and 
Reardon, 2000; Unnevehr, 2000).  
Other observers have noted that the new landscape of stringent and rapidly 
evolving standards may provide opportunities for developing countries to upgrade their 
export sectors by means of increased foreign direct investment and vertical integration 
(e.g., Jaffee and Henson, 2005; Henson and Jaffee, 2006). For example, in order to 
 
1 HACCP is a systematic preventive approach to food safety that addresses physical, chemical, and 
biological hazards as a means of prevention rather than finished product inspection. The system is used at 
all stages of the food-production and preparation processes; including packaging and distribution, in order 
to assure traceability of hazards throughout the entire supply chain. 

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comply with standards, multinational firms involved in food exports from a developing 
country may invest more resources, interact more with the local small-scale producers, 
and provide them with inputs and technology (Gow and Swinnen, 1998; Maertens and 
Swinnen, 2009). 
The mixed evidence suggests that no simple general conclusion can be drawn 
about the impact of standards on food-export sectors in developing countries and that 
research efforts should be directed to uncovering the mechanisms underlying their 
heterogeneous impact. This paper contributes to this uncovering. We present an in-depth 
case study of Benin’s shrimp export sector, which was confronted with a ban on exports 
to the EU in July 2003 after more than 30 years of export partnership.2 The ban was 
triggered by the failure of the sector to comply with EU-food safety standards and lasted 
for almost two years, being lifted only in February 2005. We describe the events leading 
to the ban and study its short and medium-run impacts at the level of the exporting firms 
and the small-scale actors (fishermen and fishmongers).
A number of studies have looked at the impact of an export ban triggered by non-
compliance with food standards (e.g., Alavi, 2009, Dey et al., 2005, Yunus, 2009, Cato 
and Santos, 2000, Calzadilla-Sarmiento, 2002, Keizire, 2004; UNIDO, 2002). While 
most of these studies document huge compliance costs and thus negative short-run effects 
when the ban is imposed, they also show a revival of the export market when the ban is 
lifted. The medium- and long-run impacts have generally been found to be positive. For 
instance, Yunus (2009) estimates the short-run cost of the 1997 EU ban on Bangladesh 
shrimp export at $25 million but estimates the gain at $18 million in the first year and 
additional yearly gains of $35 million starting from the second year. Keizire (2004) and 
Henson and Mitullah (2004) reach similar qualitative conclusions for the impacts of an 
EU ban on the fishery export sector of Uganda and Kenya, respectively. 
Our study, however, examines a case in which the export sector did not resume, 
even after the ban was lifted. Another distinctive feature is that we investigate the 
consequences of the ban both at the firm level and the level of small-scale producers. 
 
2 The ban was actually self-imposed by the Beninese government under pressure by the EU; see Section 2 
for details. 

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Previous studies on export bans have been concerned almost exclusively with the firm-
level impact.  
To study the firm-level effects, we rely on trade data as well as semi-structured 
qualitative interviews conducted in 2009 with the exporting firms, fishmongers, 
government staff, donors, and credit managers in the banking sector. The ban had a 
negative welfare impact in 2003 and shortly thereafter, and this effect persisted through 
2009, four years after the ban was lifted. We can extend this conclusion to the present 
because, at the time of writing this paper, Benin’s shrimp export sector has yet to recover. 
We argue that the sector’s smallness, as well as Benin’s weak institutional environment 
contribute to explaining the persistently negative impact of the ban. We illustrate our 
argument in the standard open-economy supply-demand framework (e.g., Baldwin and 
Wyplosz, 2009 and Krugman et al., 2011).  
For the empirical analysis at the level of small-scale actors, we use survey data on 
540 fishermen and fishmongers, collected by the authors of this paper and a team of 
enumerators. The survey was conducted in 2009, four years after the ban was lifted, to 
determine the experience of fishermen and fishmongers with the ban and its aftermath. 
While the data do not allow the use of econometric analysis to attribute welfare effects to 
the loss of exports to the EU, the interviews with the small-scale actors do provide 
substantial suggestive evidence for a large and persistent negative welfare impact. In 
particular, the information received from our respondents indicates that, with the ban, the 
prices for fresh shrimp and quantities demanded declined and that the fishermen have not 
been able to reallocate labor to other productive activities in any substantial degree. In 
fact, instead of finding alternative employment outside the fishery sector, most shrimp 
fishers have increased their intensity of fishing fish and so compete with fish fishers. 
Hence, both the shrimp and the fish fishermen reported negative income effects of the 
ban, the latter because of increased competition for catching fish, the former because of 
the loss of the lucrative export market.  
The next section presents the general background of this study by giving an 
overview of the fishery exports of developing countries to the EU and highlighting the 
importance of standards and export bans in the fishery-export sector. Section 3 provides 


information on Benin’s shrimp export sector, the events leading up to the ban, and the 
responses of different actors to the ban. Section 4 sketches the impact of the ban on the 
exporting firms and the small-scale actors in an open-economy, supply-demand 
framework. Section 5 relies on survey data to examine the underlying mechanisms of the 
impact on the small-scale actors. Section 6 contains discussion and concluding remarks. 
2. EU food standards and fishery exports from developing countries
A recent study by Batz et al. (2011) indicates that the EU’s food standards are among the 
most stringent in the world. The EU uses three strategies to maintain its system of quality 
control on its food imports. First, regular missions are undertaken by the veterinary office 
staff (DG SANCO) to screen the entire supply chain of the EU trade partners. Second, 
border controls are applied systematically to goods entering the EU market. Third, 
internal quality controls are conducted on products that are already on the EU market.  
Data on these border and internal controls are reported in the Rapid Alert System 
for Food and Feed (RASFF), which enables member countries to share information about 
the risks related to food and feed items in real time.3 The notifications reported in the 
RASFF can be broadly divided into three categories: alert notifications concerning 
products with high risks that are already on the EU market for which rapid action is 
required; information notifications about products with risks that do not require 
immediate action; and border rejections of candidate products.  
The number of notifications in RASFF has increased over time. Over the period 
2003-2011, for instance, the number of alert notifications increased from 452 to 617 
while information notifications and border rejections increased from 302 to 1,253 and 
from 1,550 to 1,816, respectively (European Commission, 2010 and 2011).  
RASFF also provides information on the actions taken in response to the alert and 
information notifications. These actions typically depend on the severity of the risks 
involved and the frequency of the notifications and vary between a withdrawal of the 
 
3 The RASFF notifications include risks on food, feed and food-contact materials. The legal basis for the 
RASFF was put into place in 2002, but the system has been in operation since 1979. Current members of 
RASFF include all of the EU Member States along with Iceland and Liechtenstein. 


product from the market, destruction of the shipment, and re-dispatching. Furthermore, 
upon repeated notifications, a mission from the veterinary office is sent to the country 
involved. In the aftermath of such a mission, the country could face the worst-case 
scenario, i.e., an outright ban of all similar products from a certain company or from an 
entire sector. 
Due to the intrinsic product-specific sanitary risk, the fishery sector is profoundly 
affected by the EU food safety standards. For instance, fishery products account for the 
largest share of notifications among all imported food products (Jaud et al., 2009), and 
data from RASFF indicate that fishery products accounted for almost one quarter of the 
total borders refusals and one third of the export suspensions in 2008-2009. Despite these 
challenges, fishery exports from developing countries have increased. For instance, over 
the period 1988-2005 fishery imports from developing countries to the EU almost 
doubled as a share of total EU food imports, rising from 5.6% to 10.9% (Jaud et al., 
2009).  
The sector’s growth in the face of increasingly stringent standards is consistent 
with the view that food standards may act as catalysts that stimulate vertical integration, 
capacity building and innovation, thus increasing the sector’s efficiency and 
competitiveness. However, other reasons may play a role as well, such as an increased 
demand for these products in advanced countries and economic growth in the exporting 
economies. Moreover, these aggregate figures hide a great degree of heterogeneity.  
This is highlighted in Figure 1, which shows shrimp-export data from Benin and 
from Bangladesh to the world and to the EU. Both countries faced a ban on exports, the 
year of the ban being indicated in the figures with a vertical grey line. Panel (a) of Figure 
1 shows that, upon the 2003 export ban, shrimp exports from Benin to the EU (and to the 
world) completely collapsed and remained close to zero for several years after the ban 
was lifted in 2005. Panel (b) shows the contrasting case of shrimp exports from 
Bangladesh to the EU, which dropped only slightly during the 1997 ban (which was 
effective from August to December) and afterwards skyrocketed, far exceeding their pre-
ban levels.  


The evolution of exports from China, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Mozambique, 
Peru Tanzania, Togo, Uganda and Vietnam provides further support for the statement that 
“there can be no general conclusion”. In particular, we find booms and busts of 
developing-country exports to the EU in the aftermath of an export suspension for fishery 
products. Among the contrasting patterns, one observation that emerges is that small 
market players (like Benin and Togo) that export almost exclusively to the EU suffer 
heavily and persistently from an EU ban, while larger players (such as Bangladesh, 
Vietnam, Malaysia, Kenya, and Uganda) that export to several destinations outside the 
EU are almost not affected, some of them not even in the short run.  
The contrasting experience between Benin and Bangladesh is indicative of the 
heterogeneity that we observe among the other developing countries that encountered an 
export ban on fishery products. For instance, while Bangladesh exports only one third of 
its total shrimp exports to the EU, Benin exported over 90% of its shrimp exports to the 
EU. In what follows, we show that this dependency had far-reaching consequences for 
Benin, which were exacerbated by the smallness of the sector and the weak institutional 
environment, and – at least for the fishermen – the limited access to alternative income 
sources.  
3. The EU and Benin’s shrimp export sector: a painful divorce and shaky reunion 
This section starts with an overview of the sector and its actors. We will then provide a 
detailed narrative of the 2003 ban and its aftermath.  
3.1 Background on Benin’s shrimp export sector 
The main shrimp specimen in Benin is Penaeus duorarum burkenroad,4 which migrates 
from the sea to inland waters to mature and (when not caught in the inland waters) returns 
to the sea after having reached adult size.5 The shrimp are mainly caught in the southern 
 
4 This species represents more than 97% of the total shrimp production of the country and is also caught in 
other West African countries such as Cote d’Ivoire, Senegal, Cameroon and Nigeria. 
5 The shrimp lay their eggs in the sea. The larvae grow in the sea till about 7 to 8 mm and then migrate to 
the brackish water in the lagoon during the dry season when the inland water level is low (from January till 

	

lakes of Nokoué and Ahémé and in the lagoon of Porto Novo.6 Shrimp fishing is a 
seasonal activity that takes place during an 8-month period, from January, when the 
shrimp migrate to the inland waters, to August, when they return to the sea. The stock of 
inland shrimp available to fishermen fluctuates between years with rainfall playing the 
greatest role by determining the amount of nutrients in, and the salinity of, the water.  
The inland fisheries of Benin are dominated by artisanal fishermen (male, with a 
few exceptions), who use small wooden canoes with paddles and/or sails. After being 
caught by the fishermen, fishmongers (mostly the fishermen’s wives) collect the shrimp 
on the water from the canoes or at numerous landing sites and sell them directly to local 
consumers, to other intermediate traders, or to the collectors recognized by the exporting 
firms. In the last case, the shrimp are sent by vehicles fitted with isothermal containers to 
the exporting plants.  
 Before the ban (July 2003), there were 3 firms: CRUSTAMER, SOBEP and 
SFG. During the ban none of the three could operate. Following the lift of the ban in 
February 2005, CRUSTAMER and SFG re-opened but stopped exporting shrimp a few 
months later. In 2005, a new firm called DIAX entered the market. It is also the only firm 
operating at the moment (January 2013). DIAX specializes in the export of fresh 
langoustines, fish and shrimp. The other companies mainly exported frozen shrimp. For 
instance, the shrimp purchased by the largest company, CRUSTAMER, were peeled, 
frozen at –45° C, and exported mainly to Spain from where they are further distributed to 
other European countries (Colette, 2003).  
Figure 2 gives an overview of the actors along the supply chain of inland shrimp. 
In addition to the three actors mentioned above, the overview includes two additional 
ones: the banks that provide the exporting firms with credit and the Directorate of 
Fisheries, which is the competent authority that controls and regulates fisheries in Benin. 
Their role in the supply chain is discussed below. 
    
March). The shrimp mature in the inland water and migrate back to the sea when the salinity of the inland 
water has decreased and the water level has increased after the rainy season (around July-August). By that 
time, the shrimp have grown to a length of about 10 cm (Cummings, 1961; Hoestlandt, 1966). 
6 Lake Nohoué is the biggest contributor to the supply of shrimp. According to data reported by Allegre and 
Dupret (2010), its share is estimated at about 2/3 of the total shrimp supply, the combined share of Lake 
Ahémé and the Lagoon of Porto Novo is 1/6. The remaining 1/6 stems from other small lakes.  



The shrimp sector represents an important source of employment in Benin. It has 
been estimated that, in 2002 (prior to the ban on export to the EU), the sector provided 
income to 45,000 fishermen, 18,500 female intermediate traders, 150 collectors 
recognized by the exporting firms, and 50 permanent employees and 1,200 seasonal 
employees (mostly women) of the exporting firms (BTC, 2007; Le Ry et al., 2007). In 
total, the shrimp sector created employment for 64,900 people, and so, when dependents 
are included – contributed to the livelihood of about 250,000 people in Benin or about 
4% of the population.  
In 2002, approximately a third of the 3,000 tonnes of shrimp caught on the three 
most important inland waters of Southern Benin (Lakes Ahémé and Nokoué and the 
Laguna of Porto Novo) were designated for export of mainly frozen shrimp destined for 
the EU market (BTC, 2007; Le Ry et al., 2007).7 The remaining 2,000 tonnes, usually of 
a smaller size and poorer quality (in function of their freshness, cleanness, size and color) 
were dried, smoked or cooked and consumed locally. 
Panel (a) in Figure 1 gives the evolution of Benin’s shrimp exports to the EU over 
the period 1996-2009. In 1999-2001, we note a sharp increase of shrimp exports from 
about 300 to almost 630 tons of frozen peeled shrimp, which corresponds to a bit less 
than 1000 tons of fresh unpeeled shrimp. This rise was due to the expanding production 
capacity of CRUSTAMER (Colette, 2003). By 2002, shrimp was Benin’s second most 
important export product after cotton. However, from 2002 onwards, the exports declined 
rapidly, falling from about 630 tons in 2002 to zero tons in 2004, the first year in which 
the ban on the export of shrimp was in force all twelve months of the year.8 After 2004, 
the export turned slightly positive again but then plunged back to only 1.5 tons in 2009.  
 
7 Fresh and chilled packaging for export are also used. 
8 The revenue of exporting firms in 2002 amounted to 1,319 million XOF for CRUSTAMER, 792 million 
for SOBEB, and 1,066 million XOF for FSG. In the years from 2003 to 2006, however, revenues were 
lower at 746 million XOF; 279 million XOF; 644 million XOF; and 518 million XOF for CRUSTAMER 
and 545 million XOF; 0 XOF; 74 million XOF; and 0 XOF for FSG (PASP, 2007; no data available for 
SOBEB). As the official exports presented in Figure 1 were zero in 2004, CRUSTAMER’s revenue of 279 
million XOF in that year may have been the result of informal exports to neighboring countries or other 
activities. 

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3.2 The ban  
In August 2002, Spain sent an information notification to the RASFF about the presence 
of a high proportion of bacteria (Enterobacteriaceae) and micro-organisms (aerobic 
mesophiles) detected in a sample of frozen shrimp imported from Benin. Following this 
notification, the EU Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) conducted its first inspection of 
Benin’s shrimp sector in October 2002. 
The inspection report pointed to the following six main deficiencies (EU DG 
SANCO, 2003): (1) shortcomings in Benin’s legislation with respect to hygiene and the 
control of fishery products; (2) lack of human resources at the competent authority; (3) 
lack of EU-accredited laboratories to monitor the safety norms applied to shrimp; (4) the 
non-conform use of chlorine and additives by exporting firms; (5) the non-application of 
Hazard Analysis Critical Control Points (HACCP) in exporting firms; and (6) bad 
practices with respect to hygiene and the environment at the level of the small producers 
and small intermediate traders. Among others, this last deficiency refers to the practice of 
fishermen keeping the shrimp on the surface of their wooden canoes instead of preserving 
them in isothermal containers with ice.  
Given these deficiencies, the FVO suggested that the Beninese government 
suspend its fishery exports to the EU and correct them. Not doing so would increase the 
risk of an official EU ban on Benin’s fishery exports (SFP, 2003). Hence, following the 
decision of the Beninese Minister charged with fisheries, the self-imposed ban on exports 
to the EU was signed on July 11, 2003.9,10  
Since the shrimp season extends from January to August, the exporting firms had 
large quantities of frozen shrimp in stock when the auto-suspension was signed. The FVO 
requested that 189 tons of shrimp be destroyed at CRUSTAMER and SFG (Le Ry et al., 
 
9 This decision is also triggered by an alert notification sent in June 2003 to the RASFF by the Netherlands 
that reported the presence of a prohibited substance (chloramphenicol) in shrimp imported from Benin. 
10 Since this was a self-imposed ban and not a suspension officially imposed by the EU, Benin remained 
officially on the list of countries that could export fishery products to EU. 

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2007).11 More importantly, the entire export sector was officially put on non-active for 
almost 20 months until the ban was lifted. 
3.3 Improvements in the aftermath of the ban 
The ban was lifted in February 2005 following significant improvements in conforming 
to the EU safety norms. In particular, the government updated the legal codes, 
strengthened the Competent Authority, and upgraded three laboratories. The exporting 
firms resolved the nonconformities and adopted the HACCP system (Hazard Analysis 
and Critical Control Points) (UNIDO, 2010).  
One of the biggest challenges was ensuring the traceability and responsibility of 
all the actors along the chain. Since 2004, the EU regulations have required auto-controls 
at all levels of the supply chain rather than leaving the control up to a central laboratory. 
In order to enable fishermen to respect safety norms and collectors to control the quality 
of shrimp purchased, facilities were constructed, which included the transformation of 
rudimentary landing sites into transfer platforms (TP) for receiving, selecting and rinsing 
shrimp before putting them in isothermal containers with ice.12 In addition to the TPs, 
control units (CU) were established to sample loads of shrimp for quality control.  
These improvements were to a large extent financed by the donor community and 
implemented in collaboration with the Beninese government agencies and other local 
actors. Thanks to this joint effort, Benin made it to List 1 in December 2009, which gives 
a select number of "harmonized" or "approved" countries that are allowed to 
 
11 A document by Allegre and Dupret (2010) mentions that these 189 tons are distributed across the three 
firms as follows: 73 tonnes for CRUSTAMER; 68 tonnes for SOBEB; and 48 tonnes for FSG. The value of 
these stocks are estimated at 307,727,061 XOF, 201,492,600 XOF; and 183,278,100 XOF (Allegre and 
Dupret, 2010). These numbers represent about 181%, 183% and 183% of the value of the capital stock 
CRUSTAMER, SOBEB and FSG, respectively. 
12 The location of TPs around the lake should allow fishermen to reach a TP within less than an hour and a 
half. At the site of the CUs, ice will be produced in order to refill the containers used by collectors and 
fishermen. The infrastructure works at Lake Ahémé, financed by Belgian Technical Co-operation, were 
completed in 2010. Four TPs are also under construction in the lagoon of Porto Novo with financial support 
of the government and several donors (Beyens, 2010). 

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exportfishery products to all EU countries without being subject to additional legislation 
on the part of individual EU countries.13  
3.4. Failure to restart export activities 
So far, this story shows that the standards acted as catalysts for investment and 
innovation in the sector. However, as we write, a stable reunion of Benin’s shrimp export 
sector with the EU is far from established. While the compliance gap between the 
Beninese shrimp sector and the EU norms has been reduced, there is much uncertainty 
about whether it can keep up with rapidly evolving EU norms. This uncertainty is 
reflected in the attitude of the banking sector. For instance, from a number of interviews 
with credit managers, we learned that the banks are reluctant to provide credit to the 
exporting firms not only because of high firm debt14 (resulting from losses due to the 
ban) but also because of the increased perceived riskiness of the shrimp-export activity 
since the ban.  
The uncertainty surrounding the sector is rooted in a number of factors. First, the 
transfer platforms had been constructed only at Lake Ahémé and not at the other lakes, 
raising concerns that the supply of shrimp to the exporting companies would be 
insufficient to cover operating costs.  
Second, although the compliance gap narrowed considerably in the aftermath of 
the ban, a number of issues dragged on for several years: (i) Until late 2009, the firms 
were still under the EU regulation 2076/2005/CE, according to which they could export 
fishery products only by means of bilateral agreements with a few EU countries: 
Belgium, France, Spain, The Netherlands and France. This kept the firms from exporting 
to potential clients in the UK and Germany. (ii) Up to the present (January 2013), the 
 
13 See the Commission Decision 2009/951/UE of December 14, 2009. Each of the three exporting firms 
(CRUSTAMER, FSG and DIAX) also obtained DG SANCO approval to export fishery products to the EU 
on December 18, 2009 (SFP, 2010). Prior to Decision 2009/951/UE; Benin was operating under Decision 
2076/2005/CE, so the country could export fishery products only under bilateral agreements with four EU 
countries: Belgium, France, The Netherlands and Spain. 
14 The amount of the firms’ debt with banks and other financial institutions was estimated at 1,271 million 
XOF for CRUSTAMER in 2006, 1,070 million XOF for FSG in 2005 and 462 million XOF for SOBEB in 
2003 (PASP, 2007). These numbers are very high compared to the values of the firms’ capital stock: 170 
million XOF, 110 million XOF, and 100 million XOF for CRUSTAMER, SOBEP, FSG, respectively. 
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laboratories used by the Benin Competent Authority have yet to meet the EU ISO/IEC-
17025 norm, which grants the right to check for chemical substances and water quality. 
Without this accreditation the risk of refusal to enter the EU markets is high. 
Third, it is not clear whether the local institutional environment is able to manage 
a high-quality high-risk supply chain. After all, the recent reduction in the compliance 
gap was heavily supported by donors instead of being a homegrown success of the local 
institutions.15 While donors financed the new infrastructure in place, it is not clear 
whether local institutions can effectively maintain and operate it. For instance, a project 
manager from one of the donor institutions involved noted that the local actors do not 
possess enough expertise or financial resources for the management of the transfer 
platforms, that the control units at some of the transfer platforms lack the high-power 
energy needed to function, and that the control units as well as the newly established 
laboratory lack qualified technicians (see also BTC, 2011). Hence, the concern that, as 
long as the sector remains dependent on the EU market for its exports, it may face a new 
export ban in the future.  
Fourth, the profitability of the exporting activity decreased following the ban not 
only because the firms had to employ additional human and physical capital to comply 
with the standards but also because both the local and international market for frozen 
shrimp evolved since the ban. Local intermediate traders were supplying more and more 
to neighboring countries. On the demand side, several European clients had turned to 
other suppliers and particularly to the Asian market.  
Because of these issues, the prospects of a swift recommencement of activities 
were low, which reduced the firms’ credit rating. In fact, banks were willing to pre-
finance the shrimp export campaign only if the government agreed to guarantee them. In 
July 2008, the government announced at the Council of Ministers the decision to 
guarantee bank loans to the shrimp exporting firms. However, it is not clear why this 
 
15 For instance, the construction of landing sites at Lake Ahémé as well the establishment of a new 
laboratory were almost entirely financed by the Belgian Technical Co-operation. Moreover, while it was 
decided that the Beninese government would contribute about 12% of the total cost of the infrastructure 
works (euro 3,033,055), at the moment the government only fulfilled about 8% of his contribution (BTC, 
2011).  
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decision has not become effective (Allegre and Dupret, 2010). One pending issue is the 
failure of exporting firms to justify the use of a soft government loan of 500 million XOF 
( € they received in 2007-2008 in order to make the investments required for 
compliance with the EU standards.  
The next section illustrates how the combination of these factors blocks the export 
market activity in Benin’s shrimp sector. 
 4. The impact of the ban: an open-economy, supply-demand analysis  
We model the market for shrimp in Benin by focusing on the involvement of three main 
actors: (i) fishermen; (ii) local consumers in Benin and in neighboring countries; and (iii) 
the exporting firms. We do not explicitly present the welfare analysis of fishmongers, but 
the effects go in the same directions as those of the fishermen. 
Fishermen supply two qualities of shrimp: high and low. The high quality shrimp 
is characterized by its larger size, pink color and freshness. Exporting firms buy only the 
high quality, whereas local consumers may buy both high and low quality shrimp.  
We integrate these features into the standard open-economy, supply-demand 
framework (e.g., Baldwin and Wyplosz, 2009 and Krugman et al., 2011) and demonstrate 
the impact of the export ban on firms and fishermen. Section 4.1 models the main 
features of Benin’s market for fresh shrimp before the ban, i.e., when the exporting firms 
were operating. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the short-term and medium-term impacts 
of the ban, respectively. Our time frame for the short-run is the period under which the 
ban was in force, i.e., from July 2003 till February 2005; while the medium-run time 
frame stretches from February 2005 - when the ban was lifted – to  2009, when we 
conducted our survey.  
4.1 The Model and the situation prior to the ban 
We make the following four assumptions. First, fishermen supply shrimp every day; 	


low-quality shrimp to local consumers and 	
 and 	
 high-quality shrimp to local 
consumers and exporting firms, respectively. The prices related to these quantities (	

, 
	
 and 	
) are denoted by 

, 
 and 
 where 

  
  
. Second, the supply 
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curves of the two qualities of shrimp are assumed to be identical and denoted by  and 

, respectively. Each supply curve is a positive function of the shrimp price. Third, the 
supply is bounded by the available stock of shrimp in the lakes, which depends on 
weather and environmental conditions as well as on past fishing intensity. We denote the 
stock of each quality of shrimp by	

 and 	
, respectively.  
The fourth assumption we make is that local consumers and fishermen are price 
takers, i.e., they cannot determine the market price for shrimp. The exporting firms are 
price takers on the world market as they cannot determine their export price . On the 
contrary, the handful of exporting firms set the price 
 at which they acquire shrimp 
from fishermen and buy at this price as long as they earn a markup  equal to   


, where  represents the expected marginal cost (including the costs of transporting, 
treating, freezing and packaging the shrimp as well as the cost of external financing from 
banks).16 Thus, the demand curve of the exporting firms, 
, is assumed to be perfectly 
elastic.  
Figure 3 (a)-(c), summarizes our open-economy, supply-demand model for the 
market of fresh shrimp in Benin. Panel (a) presents the situation before the ban, i.e., at the 
moment when the exporting firms were operating. Panels (b) and (c) show the short-run 
and medium-run impacts of the ban, respectively. Each panel has three diagrams: the left 
and middle diagrams represent the domestic market for low and high quality shrimp, 
respectively, while the diagram on the right gives the export market for high quality 
shrimp.  
In the right-hand diagram of Panel (a), exporting firms break even at the quantity 
	
for which they pay a unit price 
 to the fishermen. For the same quality of shrimp, 
local consumers are willing to pay only 
  
  
, (middle diagram of Panel (a)). As a 
 
16 From our interviews with the exporting firms’ managers, we learned that the largest of the four firms is 
the market leader and sets the price when the shrimp season starts. The other firms follow. Data reported by 
PASP (2007) and information derived from our fieldwork indicate that, prior to the ban 
 was set at about 
2 euro per kg, while the exporting firms received a price  of about 6.5 euro per kg. Thus,   
, was 
4.5 euro per kg and we can hypothesize that      euro. 
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result, fishermen sell all of their good quality shrimp to the exporting firms.17 Under these 
assumptions and given the world price of shrimp  and operating costs , exporting 
firms derive a profit represented by the purple area HIJK in the right diagram.  
The producer surplus of fishermen has two parts: one related to their supply of the 
low quality to domestic consumers, which is represented by the green area 

 in the 
left diagram; and the other is derived from the supply of high quality shrimp to the 
exporting firms given by the domain   in the middle diagram. The latter can be further 
split into two parts: the green area ! represents what the fishermen would obtain if 
they sold all high-quality shrimp to local consumers, and the dark red area ! 
represents the additional welfare fishermen obtain by selling a larger quantity at a higher 
price to exporting firms.  
The export regime represented in Panel (a) is not beneficial for local consumers as 
it deprives them of high quality shrimp. Their loss is represented by the area CDG in the 
middle diagram. Note, however, that the welfare gain of the fishermen under the export 
regime is much greater than the welfare loss of the local consumers. The area CFG 
represents this positive net welfare gain. Besides, the exporting firms also create 
employment and contribute to the foreign reserves of the central bank, adding to the 
overall positive welfare impacts of the export regime.  
Therefore, under the export regime, both the local producers and the exporting 
firms benefit largely because the prevailing world price of shrimp enables the exporting 
firms to purchase all good-quality shrimp from the artisanal fishermen at a price higher 
than what fishermen would obtain locally but low enough for the firms to make a profit. 
4.2. Short-run impacts of the export ban 
Panel (b) illustrates the short-term impacts of the export ban. In the right diagram, it 
causes the demand 
 from the exporting firms to shift down to zero. As a result, the 
profit of exporting firms disappears completely. In addition, but not shown in the figure, 
 
17 It is possible that some fishermen sell the high quality shrimp to local consumers, but this amount would 
be very small compared to the quantity supplied to exporting firms. Therefore, the model normalizes the 
amount of the high quality of shrimp sold to local consumers to zero.  
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the firms have to suffer the loss due to the destruction of their stock and also have to lay 
off employees.  
The ban also generates a loss to fishermen corresponding to the area !  in the 
middle diagram. However, local consumers derive a welfare gain from the ban as they are 
now able to buy high quality shrimp. This gain, given by the area !, is less than the 
loss of the fishermen’s producer surplus.  
This is not, however, the end of the story. As good quality shrimp are now 
supplied to the local markets, the demand for its substitute (bad quality shrimp) 

 shifts 
to the left, leading to a further reduction of the welfare of the fishermen. During the 
fieldwork, we learned that some of them tried to limit these welfare losses by increasing 
their fishing intensity, see Sections 5 and 6 for details. We do not show this effect here as 
we think it is not essential for the current analysis.  
4.3. Medium-run impacts of the ban 
In 2005 the export ban was lifted, but the firms exporting frozen shrimp did not resume 
activities. The reasons for this failure, which were listed in Section3.4, are now illustrated 
in Panel (c).  
The diagram on the right shows that, after the ban, the exporting firms faced costs 
"#$, which were significantly higher than the pre-ban cost . The reasons for the cost 
increase – which were detailed in Section 3.4 - can be summarized as follows: (i) The 
exporting firms needed to finance the additional physical and human capital required to 
meet the higher food safety standards. (ii) Even though the sector was upgraded, the 
precedent of the ban as well as some pending non-compliance issues had increased the 
perceived riskiness of the export activity. (iii) Related to the second point, the firms had 
to pay a higher interest rate on new loans from the banking sector (consistent with the 
lowering of the sector’s credit rating; see our discussion in Section 3.2). (iv) If they 
resumed activities (instead of filing for bankruptcy), the firms would have to repay their 
high debt to the banking sector (resulting from the non-reimbursement of credit in the 
year of the ban).  
	
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Keeping the export price  and the markup  fixed, these additional costs imply 
that the firms will only operate when they can purchase shrimp at a lower price %&
'(). 
However, if %&
'()  is less than the local market price %&
*() , then all the good-quality 
shrimp will be sold locally. This scenario, depicted in the middle and right diagrams of 
Panel (c), corresponds to the information received during our field trip. 
Our interviews with intermediate traders revealed that the local market for good-
quality shrimp expanded since the ban, with increased sales to neighboring countries 
(Nigeria, Togo, Gabon and Ghana). This expansion led to a price increase in the local 
markets, such that %&
*() + %&
'() (see the middle diagram). However, the traders also 
noted that this increase could not compensate for their loss of the European export 
market; partly because of the high transaction costs in the forms of border taxes and the 
poor transport infrastructure to the local markets. They also complained about price 
fluctuations in the local markets and the lack of timely payment (for the latter point, see 
also Allegre and Dupret, 2010).  
Why don’t the firms increase 
,- a bit to beat local markets and still earn a 
small profit? In other words, why are firms not willing to operate with a lower profit 
margin? In our opinion, the answer lies in a wait-and-see strategic behavior on the part of 
the firms. The firms were waiting for the government to finance part of the new costs 
associated with compliance, to intervene in settling the outstanding debt with the banking 
sector, and to act as guarantor for new loans (and so to obtain lower interest rates).18 In 
July 2008, the government announced at the Council of Ministers the decision to  
guarantee bank loans to the exporting firms of shrimp. It is not clear why this decision 
has not become effective (Allegre and Dupret, 2010). One pending issue is that exporting 
firms failed to justify the use of a soft government loan of 500 million XOF (
€ they received in 2007-2008 in order to make the investments required for 
compliance with the EU standards. Another reason mentioned by the firms for delaying 
 
18 Exporting firms were expecting these arrangements because they learned that Senegalese firms received 
similar treatment and that the French Cooperation subsidized firms operating in fisheries in Senegal and 
Cote d’Ivoire when they faced problems with the implementation of standards.  

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their entry is related to the decrease of the world market price  due to increased 
international competition since the ban (especially from Asia). These developments put 
further downward pressure on 
,- and thus discourage entry.  
5. Evidence from a survey among fishermen and fishmongers 
The model above shows that the ban led to a decline in the producer surplus of shrimp 
fishers. This surely implies an income loss in the short run. In the longer run, however, a 
number of fishermen may leave the shrimp supply chain and compensate their income 
loss with income from other activities. To assess whether fishermen face persistent 
income losses, we study their income and activity portfolio changes on the basis of data 
from a survey that was undertaken in 2009, six years after the imposition of the ban and 
four years after the ban was lifted. Section 5.1 briefly introduces the data; Sections 5.2 
and 5.3 discuss the self-reported causes and consequences of the ban and coping 
strategies.  
5.1. Data used 
The households were selected from the 2006 fishery census, which recorded information 
on 27,568 small-scale actors, mostly fishermen and fishmongers, operating in the fishery 
sector of southern Benin. We took a random sample of 540 households, stratified 
geographically across 18 villages that are part of three administrative communes located 
on the three lakes: Lake Nokoué (So-Ava Commune); Lake Ahémé (Kpomasse 
Commune); and Lagune de Porto-Novo (Aguégués Commune). Within these households, 
we identified 516 fishermen and 394 fishmongers (from now on referred to as fishwives). 
The location of the three communes and lakes is shown in Figure 4. The 
communes differ in a number of relevant aspects. So-Ava is located on the largest lake 
and is the most remote commune. It has many traditional fishing villages built on the 
water, resulting in pollution from human waste and lower quality of shrimp with respect 
to the EU standard. Kpomasse, although located furthest from the exporting firms, can 
easily be reached across land and is located at Lake Ahémé, which is a relatively small 
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lake that was the preferred supplier of the exporting firms because of the its highly 
appreciated quality of shrimp (reflected in a larger size and more reddish color of the 
shrimp). Aguegues is the least remote commune and provides shrimp of intermediate 
quality. 
The household members were interviewed in the period March-July 2009, during 
the 2009 shrimp season, by the authors of this paper and a team of 30 enumerators and 4 
supervisors. In order to collect accurate information on income and consumption, the 
households were visited every two weeks. During each of these visits, income and 
consumption data were recorded. In addition, a standard household module was 
implemented covering different topics at each visit, such as social capital, credit, annual 
income and economic activities, shocks and coping strategies, health and education. From 
the data, we found that household income in 2009 stemmed for more than 80% from the 
fishery sector of which 30% was accounted for by the shrimp subsector.  
5.2. Self-reported causes and impacts of the ban  
During the first survey visit, the fishermen and fishwives were asked to share their 
experiences regarding the ban. The following questions were asked:  
(i) Are you aware that there has been a ban? (If no: move on to the next section; 
if yes, continue.)  
(ii) What is the cause of the ban?  
(iii) What impact did the ban have on your income immediately after the ban (in 
2003) and today (in 2009)?  
(iv) What explains this impact?  
(v) If the impact was negative, how did the household react to cope with it, 
immediately after the ban (in 2003) and what is it doing today (in 2009)? 
The answers to the first two questions are summarized in Table 1. We found that 82% 
of both the fishermen and fishwives knew about the ban at the time of the survey.19 This 
 
19 Among the fifth that was not aware of the ban, a number of actors did not catch or trade shrimp (or did so 
prior to the ban) but specialize in other species (fish, oyster, crab). When excluding those actors, the 

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proportion varied across the communes. In So-Ava, the commune that is most isolated, 
only 68% of the fishermen and fishwives were aware of the ban. In Kpomasse and 
Aguegues, 81% and 97% of the fishermen and fishwives knew about the ban. 
Regarding the second question about the cause of the ban (asked to those who knew 
about the ban), only 40% of the fishermen and 45% of fishwives report as a cause that 
“the food safety norms were not sufficiently respected”; while 20% said they had no idea 
why. In the remaining 30% to 40%, the answers varied widely, including “the Europeans 
no longer had money”, “the firms went bankrupt”, “the local authorities were arguing”, 
“the European who bought the shrimp is on a holiday”, “we need to provide food to 
Beninese markets (instead of European markets)”, “it is because of the use of prohibited 
fishing gears” and “the Houedah are behind it”.20 These responses indicate that general 
awareness about the compliance issue is relatively low despite the efforts of the donors 
and the local authorities to involve the small-scale actors more in the good management 
of the supply chain, e.g., by conducting village-by-village information sessions.  
Table 2, Panel A summarizes the self-reported income effect of the ban in 2003. 
Close to 59% of the respondents reported a very negative impact in the short run, and 
26% report a rather negative impact. Approximately 9% report “no impact”, and about 
5% mention a positive impact. Corresponding well with its status as preferred supplier to 
the exporting firms, Kpomasse had the highest proportion of actors mentioning a strongly 
negative effect (84%), followed by Aguegues (56%) and So-Ava (33%).  
When asked about the reason for the negative short-run impact of the ban, more than 
70% of those who reported a negative impact attributed it to “a low price because of lack 
of purchasers”. This is consistent with the price decrease that features in the model 
presented in Section 4.2. Other reported reasons are diverse and include “the market is 
far”, “it is complicated now that we have to sell to Togolese, Gabonese and Nigerian 
markets”, or “we have to throw away the shrimp or smoke them for lack of buyers of 
    
proportion of informed actors increases only slightly from 82% to 84% among fishermen and 88% among 
fishwives.
20 The Houedah is a group which is competing for the fishery resources with the Goun and the Tofin, which 
are different but related groups speaking different dialects belonging to the same family of Gbe languages 
(Hounkpati, 1991). 
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fresh shrimp”. Among the 5% who reported a positive impact, the reason mentioned is 
“new market opportunities”, suggesting that a minority of the respondents could take 
advantage of the export market failure. From our interviews, we learned this was the case 
for larger intermediate traders who increased their interactions with markets in 
neighboring countries. 
Panel B of Table 2 summarizes the self-reported assessment by the local actors on the 
ban’s medium-term impact (6 years after the ban). When asked about the ban’s income 
effect in 2009, up to 52% of the households still reported a very negative impact, and 
30% reported a rather negative impact. The most frequently cited reasons for the 
persistent negative effect were the persistently low price and the difficulty of selling in 
distant markets.  
5.3. Coping strategies and activity portfolio strategies 
The persistent self-reported negative welfare impact suggests that the domestic and 
regional demand did not succeed in substituting for EU demand even after considerable 
time. It also indicates that fishermen households were unable to cope adequately with the 
drop in shrimp demand, for example, by substituting shrimp fishing with another activity, 
which would be the coping strategy par excellence for dealing with a persistent covariant 
shock.
It is well documented that, when faced with a non-negligible adverse income shock, 
households in developing countries resort to a wide range of coping strategies in order to 
smooth consumption, including self-insurance through dissaving, increased labor effort, 
migration and mutual insurance. The choice of strategy depends on the size and the type 
of the shock (Dercon, 2004). The export ban can be characterized as a covariant and 
highly persistent shock, i.e., many households within the same community were 
negatively affected at the same time and the shock was not limited to one point in time 
(exports were suspended for several consecutive months).  
To understand how the small-scale producers in our sample reacted to this shock, we 
study their answers to the following question: “If the impact was negative, how did the 
household react to cope with it immediately after the ban (in 2003) and today (in 2009)?”. 

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The answers are summarized in Table 3. Given that the shock was covariant and 
persistent, it is not surprising that the households in our sample rarely reported mutual 
insurance (“asking for help from friends and family”) as a coping strategy, while 
“developing another activity“ was frequently reported. Other coping strategies that were 
frequently reported were “no reaction”, “selling assets”, “consume less”, “take 
consumption credit”, “work more hours”, and – to a lesser extent - “take child(ren) out of 
school”. Much less frequently reported coping strategies include “reduce the number of 
children”, “casual (agricultural) labor” and “migrate to Nigeria”.  
A number of these coping strategies reduce the household’s capital, be it physical or 
human. Although they contribute to consumption smoothing in the short run, these 
strategies may negatively affect income in the longer run. Hence, the most viable coping 
strategy when faced with a prolonged negative demand shock for shrimp would be to 
switch to another activity. This conjecture finds support in the data. Among the 62 
fishermen who reported having switched activities following the ban, only 39% reported 
a very negative impact of the ban in 2009 compared to an average of 51% (and over 70% 
for fishermen reporting the other three most frequent reactions: “no reaction”, “asset 
sale”, and “consume less”).21  
To investigate the effectiveness of an activity-portfolio change further, we analyze the 
data from a module on economic activities asking fishermen about their economic 
activities in 2002 and in 2009. Among the 62 fishermen who self-reported having
switched activities following the ban, the large majority (77%) remained in the fishery 
sector by switching to fishing fish (instead of shrimp). Thus, they ended up competing 
with other fishermen for the scarce fishery stock. Only 14 fishermen who changed 
activities between 2002 and 2009 (23%) switched to activities outside the fishery sector. 
These fishermen reported a very negative income effect of the ban only in 29% of cases 
compared to 42% for those who switched activities within the fishery sector, which 
suggests that switching to the non-fishery sector was the most effective coping strategy. 
 
21 For fishwives, we find similar results. The 51 fishwives who changed activities reporting a very negative 
impact in 33% of cases compared to an average of 53%. 
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That this strategy was applied by only a handful of fishermen indicates that access to the 
non-fishing sector was constrained.22
6. Discussion and concluding remarks 
Different country experiences illustrate that an export ban may act as a catalyst or as a 
barrier for a country’s export sector. We studied the case of Benin’s shrimp sector, which 
collapsed upon the 2003 export ban. Strikingly, the sector did not revive, even though the 
ban was lifted in 2005. We stress that the sector’s dependency on the EU, its smallness, 
and Benin’s poor institutional environment played critical roles.  
Putting all of one’s eggs in one basket is risky. Because of its reliance solely on 
the EU market, the ban on shrimp exports from Benin to the EU basically put the 
exporting firms out of business, which led to the current situation of unsettled debt. In its 
turn, this dependency on the EU market is explained by the underdevelopment of the 
regional market (regarding its purchasing power and infrastructure) as well as the size of 
the sector, which is limited by the capacity of the lakes.  
Smallness also played a role in a more direct way. Complying with standards 
involves fixed costs (upgrading laboratories, training fishery experts and fishermen, etc.) 
which, in the case of a small sector, are shared by few actors. In a small sector, the 
potential total pay-off is also low in terms of both firm revenue and tax revenue for 
governments. This may greatly reduce the incentives for firms and governments to invest 
in a small export sector. In the case of Benin, donors incurred huge sunk costs in 
infrastructure for controlling, treating and transporting the shrimp from the lakes to the 
firms, but the firms and the government (e.g., as a potential guarantee for credit to the 
sector) were hesitant to take the further steps necessary to revive exports. 
The institutional environment also plays a crucial role. As argued by Martinez and 
Poole (2004), the key to success in keeping up with the evolving EU standards lies in 
 
22 In a study on income diversification in the fishing communities in our sample, we explain the extremely 
low degree of income diversification among fishermen in terms of the remoteness of their communities, the 
difficulty of access to agricultural land, and especially the lack of schooling with close to 70% of active 
adults being illiterate (Stoop et al., 2013). 
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moving towards a new paradigm of competition between supply chains rather than 
competition between producers. In this new paradigm, the relationship between the 
different types of actors along the supply chain shifts from being purely transactional to 
becoming more co-operative. All the actors of a supply chain – the producers, suppliers 
and retailers – are inter-dependent managers of the quality of the same final product and 
the success of their combined management depends on the extent of the co-operation, 
information exchange and trust between them. These attributes are in short supply in 
Benin’s shrimp sector as we could conclude from interviews with the firms, the 
competent authority (civil servants in the ministry of fisheries), and the fishermen from 
the different communities.  
For example, when asked about the ban, only 33% of fishermen knew about it and 
the reasons for it. In addition, the fishing community is fractionalized between different 
ethnic groups and inter-group trust is very low. Also higher up in the supply chain, 
mistrust plays a role: following allegations of misuse of a soft government loan by the 
firms, the Beninese government was hesitant to continue to support the firms and was 
waiting for the results of the investigation by the national debt committee. Finally, 
lacking confidence in the capacity of the firms and governments to face up to the future 
financial and market challenges (without further extensive donor support), the banks were 
reluctant to provide credit to the sector.  
What are the welfare implications of a ban at the level of small-scale producers? 
The last part of this paper points out that the stringent EU standards had an important and 
persistent negative impact on the income of fishermen and fishwives. The access to world 
markets, which translated into a perfectly elastic demand of exporting firms, assured 
daily market clearance for the fishermen. Being small, much poorer, and plagued by high 
transport and transaction costs and with limited access to inexpensive preservation 
technology, the domestic and regional markets could not take over this role. In addition, 
fishermen were constrained in their access to the non-fishery sector. As such, switching 
activities proved an effective coping strategy for only a handful of fishers and was 
insufficient to compensate for the loss in producer surplus. Instead, shrimp fishers 


engaged in competition with fish fishers or intensified their shrimp fishing activity, 
thereby compromising the future fishery stock. 
Is there a future for Benin’s shrimp sector? Provided that the cold chain is 
respected by all the actors (including the fishermen and the intermediate traders), the 
control units and transfer platforms operate, and the firms’ financial situation is sorted 
out, Benin possesses a very well-appreciated product that satisfies the highest food and 
safety norms. However, the question remains whether, given its institutional 
environment, Benin will be able to keep up with rapidly evolving EU norms and be able 
to (re)conquer the market and compete with the expanding Asian shrimp export with a 
small-size shrimp of standard quality but for a very low price. One strategy could be to 
stress the flavor and size of Benin’s shrimp. In addition, the sector could also seek added 
value by aiming at labels for artisanal and/or environmentally sustainable fishing. 
However, the demanding administrative requirements and procedures to obtain special 
labels require skill and expertise that are far beyond the current capacity of actors in the 
sector.23 Until the local capacity and coordination issues are resolved, the situation will 
remain frozen.  
Another fundamental problem that needs to be addressed is overfishing. There is 
an urgent need for effective institutions to regulate Benin’s fisheries and preserve the 
fishery stock for future generations. At present, such institutions are lacking and the 
pressure on the lake is mounting. Partly as a response to the ban, partly as a reaction to 
the degradation of the lakes’ resources, fishers increased their fishing effort, by fishing 
during more hours a day but mostly by using more damaging fishing gears.24 If continued 
 
23 For instance, Fair Trade Organizations require keeping records for all marketed shrimp in order to trace 
their origin to members of cooperatives. 
24 Especially the increased use of the acadja and the medokpokonou have contributed to the problem of 
overfishing and resource degradation. The acadja can best be described as ‘private fishing ponds’, 
constructed by placing wooden branches in the lake and fencing them with fishing nets. They cover an 
increasingly large share of the surface of major lakes, which reduces oxygen levels, retards water 
circulation and restricts the fishing area available for non-acadja owners. The medokpokonou is also a fixed 
fishing installation, but it is not closed by nets. Instead, nets, several meters long, are set in such a manner 
that the fish get trapped. Initially designed for catching shrimp, it has fine-mesh nets, which also trap young 
fish and fish eggs, thereby reducing the reproduction of the fishing stock. The medokpokonou also has 
direct negative externalities for other fishers because the nets are usually set out close to narrow channels 
and so catch virtually all the fish entering the lake and leaving few for fishermen further downstream. That 



unregulated, the ecosystem will be affected, and the available shrimp stock may 
permanently decrease. Studying these issues is out of the scope of this paper but are 
addressed in, among others, Stoop et al. (2013) and Briones Alonso et al. (mimeo). 
  
    
fishermen try to compensate their income loss by fishing more relates to the lack of effective institutions to 
regulate the fishing activity and to the severely constrained access to economic activities outside the fishery 
sector (see our discussion in Briones Alonso, et al., (mimeo) and Stoop et al., (2013). 
	

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Figure 1: The Dynamics of Exports  
a. Shrimp exports from Benin to the world and to the EU 
b. Shrimp exports from Bangladesh to the world and to the EU 
Notes: Export data is taken from the UN Comtrade database. The grey area shows the 
year of the EU ban.
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